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Abstract
The demand for cash balances of financial intermediaries that establish contractual
liabilities with credit-sensitive customers is characterised. As stated by Merton, the
success of the business activities of such firms crucially depends on their credit qual-
ity, and hence, they are obliged to rely on deposit insurance and capital cushions in
order to assure that their promised payments are free of default. Unlike the Merton’s
approach, the optimal guaranteeing contract is formulated in actuarial terms in this
paper, because in this way the model can be extended to consider the situation of firms
that can only hedge up to a limited extent. Within this framework, the equilibrium in
the market determines the rate at which a unit of capital is exchange by a unit of risk,
or, in other words, it determines the market price of risk. Episodes of liquidity crises
are meaningful in this theoretical setting.
Key words: The cost of capital; Liquidity preference; Monetary equilibrium; Fi-
nancial instability; Liquidity crises.
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1 Introduction
Investors holding financial securities with random outcomes are exposed to unknown balances
equal to the differences between the market values of outstanding assets and liabilities.
When positive, such a surplus can be lent at the overnight interest rate in order to avoid
keeping idle money, while, by contrast, short-term debt can be attracted when a net lost is
suffered. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have noticed that, since in perfect capital markets
such operations can be performed without restrictions, rational decision-makers — who are
assumed to maximise value — should demand no equity, for it is costly and provides no
benefit. However, frictions in capital markets can prevent this mechanism to fully operate in
practice. As a matter of fact, premiums are normally charged on market prices depending
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on credit-ratings and the size of loans, evidencing that the cost of restructuring debt can be
incremented when the magnitude of losses increases up to certain levels. Those firms that
cannot afford such extra costs are forced to default. Under such circumstances, the financial
position and so the performance of companies are affected by the preferred surpluses.
Merton (1997) proposes a model to determine the price of insuring liability contracts
established by opaque financial intermediaries with credit-sensitive and averse-to-risk cus-
tomers. In this setting, credit-sensitivity characterises the attitude of economic agents who
expect that the promised payments will be delivered with certainty, while opacity refers to
the fact that the business activities of financial institutions are normally unknown to out-
siders. Additionally, customers are supposed to lack the expertise to diversify and to hedge
efficiently. Within this framework, the role of financial intermediaries is that of providing in-
sured liability contracts to customers that cannot continuously modify their portfolios. The
efficiency of such services crucially depends on the perceptions of customers about the credit
quality of the intermediary. As long as the value of the guarantee and the value of the firm
are interpreted as contingent claims on the market value of net assets, equal to the market
values of assets minus liabilities, optimal arrangements can be determined by maximising
the value of the firm and by minimising the cost of insolvency.
A fundamental assumption in the model of Merton is that financial intermediaries can
hedge continuously and efficiently and that they can accordingly sell this service to their
customers. But what is the situation in markets where even the most solvent institutions
can only hedge up to a limited extent? After all, every financial company stops relying on
trading at some limit and prefer to call instead for reinsurance and risk capital cushions. An
actuarial approach is proposed in this paper to describe this situation, according to which
(in a similar way to that adopted by Merton, 1974 and 1977), the optimal surpluses of
shareholders and guarantors are respectively determined at the levels where the value of the
firm is maximised and where the cost of bankruptcy is minimised. Then, as demonstrated
in Section 2, the optimal levels of reserves are determined by the quantile functions of the
series of capital returns of the intermediaries’ portfolios.
The total cash balance demanded by the market is defined in Section 3 as the sum of the
surpluses demanded by investors, customers and financial intermediaries. A more general
framework can be characterised by assuming that creditors can control the total supply of
capital in the market and the cost of capital is determined in order to satisfy the necessary
condition that the total supply is equal to the total demand of equity. Consequently, as
proved in Section 4, the monetary equilibrium determines a set of combinations of the
supply of cash balances and the demand for money to spend on the transaction of securities,
the rate of interest r, as well as the expected return and the volatility of the market portfolio.
On these grounds, the cost of capital in financial markets is defined by the probability
that the market capital loss surpasses the ratio of the supply of cash balances to the volume of
funds spent in the transactions of securities, or, in other words, it is equal to the probability
that the cash-guarantee maintained at the aggregated level is insufficient to cover the total
realised loss. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the return to be paid for holding a given
uncertain claim instead of investing on a non-risky zero-coupon bond with a predetermined
maturity. Such a rate corresponds to the return to be obtained when investing one monetary
unit on the underlying risk and can accordingly be regarded as the Internal Rate of Return on
Risk (IRRR). Therefore, every pair of fixed levels of the equity supply and the transactions
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volume determines a Risk-Structure of Interest Rates over the plane of expected returns and
volatilities, providing the price to be asked for exchanging a given risk for equity. Such
structure of interest rates is studied in Section 5.
The analysis of the elasticity of the demand for cash balances with respect to the interest
rate and the shape of the risk-structure of interest rates in Sections 4 and 5 leads to a precise
description of financial markets in terms of the capital flows and the risk-parameters of the
market portfolio. More specifically, the derived expressions for the preference for liquidity
and the internal rate of return on risk, which are dependent on observable variables, can be
regarded as measures of the liquidity conditions in the market. On the grounds of a partial
equilibrium approach, different states can be compared, thus allowing to distinguish the
more stable and the more vulnerable to violent adjustments. The empirical analysis carried
on in Sections 6, 7 and 8 illustrates the kind of representation that can be obtained from
the model. In particular, the liquidity crises occurred in October 1987 and April 2000 (the
Black Monday and the dot-com bubble) can be satisfactorily interpreted in terms of the paths
followed by the empirical expected returns and volatilities of the series of capital returns of
the corresponding indexes. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 The Optimal Demand for Cash Balances
According to Merton (1997), the capital structure affects the value of firms that establish
contractual liabilities with customers who are sensible to the default-risk of the involved
payments. Such customers are characterised by their unwillingness to share the risk taken
by the intermediary — even if they were offered a fair premium reduction — a situation that
is aggravated due to the fact that the business activities of financial companies are usually
unknown to outsiders, i.e. these institutions are opaque to outsiders. Additionally, customers
are supposed to lack the expertise required to diversify or to hedge by themselves and to
face higher transaction costs. By contrast, the investors in the stocks and bonds issued by
financial companies agree to afford the cost of bankruptcy, provided they are compensated
by the appropriate expected return. In this context, the role of financial intermediation is to
attract funds from risk-neutral investors and from averse-to-risk customers to hold financial
assets. The success of this kind of firms critically depends on their ability to assure to their
customers that the promised payments will be made with certainty.
Three different strategies are available to provide protection against default-risk: hedging,
insuring and risk-capital cushions. In the model of Merton (1997), intermediaries prefer
hedging. Two different option-based contracts are then established, one involving the firm
and stockholders and delivering the excess of the value of net assets (equal to assets minus
liabilities) over the level of cash holdings, and another involving the firm and some external
guarantor, who guarantees the cash flows promised to customers. The surplus S of the
intermediary is then represented by the market value of net assets and is supposed to follow
a Brownian motion with expected return µ and volatility σ:
dS = µdt+ σdz
where dz is a Wiener stochastic process. Then the value of the firm as well as the value of
the guarantee are contingent claims on the value of net assets, which can be characterised
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by imposing equilibrium-pricing formulas and providing adequate boundary conditions. The
optimal contracts established with shareholders and guarantors can thus be respectively
established in order to maximise the value of the firm and to minimise the cost of bankruptcy
(see also Merton, 1974, 1977).
However (as already stated by Merton, 1997), the distinction between intermediaries,
guarantors, customers and investors can be difficult in actual financial markets. As a matter
of fact, some financial institutions acting as guarantors to some firms or individual investors,
can be customers of or investors in other companies. Eventually, every financial institution
will stop relying on hedging and will seek for reinsuring and risk capital to assure the solvency
of its business activities. The capital structure of this kind of firms will be next characterise.
As in the model of Merton, two contracts will be defined, one involving the maximisation
of the value of the firm, and the other involving the minimisation of the cost of insolvency.
But since these will be now supposed to be insuring contracts, an actuarial setting will be
required.
In order to establish these contracts in formal terms, let us assume that every intermediary
holds a net-portfolio combining capital and some Gaussian exposure X, characterised by a
pair of expected return and volatility (µ, σ) and corresponded to the series of (random)
capital Profit and Losses (P&L) of the value V of the underlying fund. Since each monetary
unit invested on risk produces the percentage return X, the total P&L accrued by the
underlying fund must be equal to:
L ·X = L ·∆V with Xt = Vt − Vt−1
Vt−1
∀t
where the variable L denotes the amount of funds spent on transactions. The random
variable X can be certainly related to the surplus S defined by Merton, but recall that X
has been expressed in percentage terms — in such a way that the absolute return is also
dependent on the transactions volume.
Let us additionally express the magnitude of the guarantee, in the following denoted
by K, as a proportion k of the transactions volume, in such a way that K = L · k. The
agreements established by the financial intermediary are then defined in the following way.
On the one hand, stockholders supply the balance K = L · k with the promise of receiving
this amount back plus the return in excess (X − k) if the firm is solvent and delivers a
benefit over the level of capital, i.e. if X > k. On the other hand, the firm establishes a
contract with some insurance company that promises to pay the excess of loss (X +k) when
bankruptcy is declared, i.e. when X < −k. Hence the total payments, respectively delivered
to stockholders and received from the guarantor at the end of the investment period, are
equal to L · (X − k) and L · (X + k). In other words, as long as the amount of capital K
is invested in the market of cash balances to obtain the return r, the payments, per unit of
investment, endured and received by the firm at the end of the investment period, are given
by:
Y S = (X − k) + r · k when X > k
Y G = (X + k) + r · k when X < −k
which can be equivalently expressed as:
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Y S = (X − k)+ + r · k = max(0, X − k) + r · k
Y G = (X + k)− + r · k = −min(0, X + k) + r · k (1)
Whenever −k ≤ X ≤ k, no capital gains are obtained and additional debt is required to
pay the guarantee back, though the size of the losses is bounded by the level of reserves.
Stockholders are expected to sell their shares or to call for restructuring in this case.
On these grounds, two different kind of firms can be distinguished, depending on the
criteria determining their capital structures. There are, in the first place, firms that seek
to maintain their relationship with stockholders in the best terms and accordingly seek to
maximise the return Y S. In the second place, there are firms more concerned about their
relationship with guarantors and customers that accordingly prefer to minimise the return
Y G. While those firms belonging to the first group can be regarded as speculative firms,
as long as their focus on profits may lead them to implement more aggressive investment
strategies, those in the second group can be regarded as precautionary firms, as long as
their objective is to reduce their risk exposure to a minimum. Moreover, since the capital
return X is represented by a random variable, both Y S and Y G are also represented by
random variables, which means that the optimal surpluses should be determined based on
the expected values of the residual exposures E[(X − k)+] and E[(X + k)−].
Recall that any random variable can be equivalently represented by its cumulative prob-
ability function FX and its tail probability function TX , functions that are related to each
other through the fundamental identity:
TX(k) = P [X > k] = 1− P [X ≤ k] = 1− FX(k)
Besides, in a Gaussian setting, both functions can be expressed in terms of the cumulative
probability Φ of the standard Gaussian, whose mean return and volatility are respectively
equal to zero and one:
TX(k) = 1− FX(k) = 1− Φ
(
k − µ
σ
)
(2)
In fact, the Gaussian cumulative and tail probability function are explicitly defined as:
FX(k) = P [X ≤ k] =
∫ k
−∞ dFX(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
· ∫ k−∞ exp [−(x−µ)22σ2 ] dx
TX(k) = P [X > k] =
∫ +∞
k
dFX(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
· ∫ +∞
k
exp
[
−(x−µ)2
2σ2
]
dx
(3)
Additionally, applying the mathematical definition of the expectation operator we obtain
that:
E
[
(X − k)+
]
=
∫ +∞
+k
(x− k) · dFX(x) = 1
σ
√
2π
·
∫ +∞
+k
(x− k) · exp
[−(x− µ)2
2σ2
]
dx (4)
and also:
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E
[
(X + k)−
]
= −
∫ −k
−∞
(x+ k) · dFX(x) = − 1
σ
√
2π
·
∫ −k
−∞
(x+ k) · exp
[−(x− µ)2
2σ2
]
dx (5)
Therefore, speculative firms (which maximise the expected excess return) determine their
capital structures by solving the following optimisation problem:
max
k
E
[
(X − k)+
]
+ r · k (6)
Applying the Leibniz integral rule for the differentiation of a definite integral whose limits
are functions of the differential variable,1 we obtain from Equation 4 that:
∂
∂k
E
[
(X − k)+
]
=
∫ +∞
+k
(−1) · dFX(x) = −TX(k)
The solution to the maximisation problem of Equation 6 can then be obtained by applying
Lagrange optimisation, which implies that the optimal cash balance kS of speculative firms
is characterised by the first-order condition:
∂
∂k
E
[ (
X − kS)
+
]
+ r = −TX
(
kS
)
+ r = 0
The optimal surplus of speculative firms is thereby given by the inverse function of the tail
probability:
kS(r) = σ · Φ−1(1− r) + µ (7)
According to this specification, the optimal balance of speculative firms is always a non-
increasing and continuous function of the interest rate — for the cumulative function Φ
is a non-decreasing and continuous function of its argument. Besides, the minimum and
maximum cash balances are respectively maintained when r ≥ 1 and r ≤ 0.
In a similar way, the optimal balance of precautionary firms (which minimise the expected
loss endured in case of default) is determined by the following minimisation problem:
min
k
E
[
(X + k)−
]
+ r · k (8)
Applying the Leibnitz’s rule to the integral of Equation 5, we obtain that:
∂
∂k
E
[
(X + k)−
]
= −
∫ −k
−∞
1 · dFX(x) = −T−X(k)
Then the first-order condition of the problem of Equation 8 leads to:
1According to this rule:
∂
∂z
∫
v(z)
u(z)
f(x, z) dx =
∫
v(z)
u(z)
∂f(x, z)
∂z
dx + f (v(z), z) · ∂v(z)
∂z
− f (u(z), z) · ∂u(z)
∂z
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∂∂k
E
[ (
X + kG
)
−
]
+ r = −T−X
(
kG
)
+ r = 0
and the optimal cash balance of precautionary firms is then equal to:
kG(r) = σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (9)
Consequently, the optimal capital demand of precautionary firms also follows a non-increasing
and continuous path and again the minimum and maximum levels of surplus are respectively
demanded when r ≥ 1 and r ≤ 0. Discrepancies relative to preferred cash-balances can thus
be explained on the basis of the underlying risks and the opportunity cost of capital.
From the actuarial point of view, the term E
[
(X + k)−
]
represents the excess of loss
suffered by the issuer of some insuring policy covering the loss of the mutual fund X, where
the retention or deductible is equal to k. Such a contract is known as a layer in the actuarial
literature. The deductible is introduced in these contracts in order to assure that the holder
of the policy will take every reasonable care to reduce the probability and the magnitude
of losses. It then explicitly accounts for the moral-hazard inherent in the agreement —
because insurers cannot directly observe the behaviour of policyholders. On these grounds,
the optimal cash balance, as determined by Equation 7 or Equation 9, can be corresponded
to the optimal retention or optimal deductible of the related deposit insurance contract. In
the next section, the aggregated money demand of the market will be characterised by the
sum of the optimal balances determined at the microscopic level.
3 The Aggregate Demand for Cash Balances
On the grounds of the P&L optimisation problem stated in the previous section, an optimal
surplus exists that explicitly depends on the riskiness of the underlying fund, the return
obtained for lending in the market of cash balances and the type of the firm. Indeed, from
Equations 7 and 9, we obtain that the magnitudes of the optimal cash balance is always
positively related to the volatility and negatively related to the rate of interest. However,
while in the cases µ > 0 and µ < 0 speculative firms respectively increment and reduce the
demand for capital as the magnitude of the mean return increases, when µ > 0 and µ < 0
precautionary firms respectively decrease and increase the level of equity with the magnitude
of the mean return.
The amount of reserves demanded by the market will be characterised in the following by
adding the cash balances maintained at different levels of aggregation, going from investors
and small firms, to big companies, conglomerates, industries and economic sectors. Thus,
notice in the first place that, although the capital decisions taken by speculative and precau-
tionary firms are affected in quite the opposite way by the sign of the expected return, from
the mathematical point of view this is only a matter of reference. In fact, if we assume that
the individual exposures are distributed as Gaussians with means µ1, . . . , µn and volatilities
σ1, . . . , σn, then the optimal money demands can be simply written as:
ki(r) = σi · Φ−1(1− r)− µi ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (10)
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Under this specification, the type of firms is ultimately determined by the sign of the expected
return, since the roles of speculative and precautionary firms are respectively corresponded
to the cases µi < 0 and µi > 0. This convention is equivalent to assume that for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the mean return µi represents an average capital loss.
Summing up the balances maintained by all the firms in the market when their liquidity-
preferences are given by the functions in Equation 10, we obtain that the total level of
reserves KM demanded by the market is equal to:
KM =
n∑
i=1
Li · ki(r) = Φ−1(1− r) ·
n∑
i=1
Li σi −
n∑
i=1
Li µi
where L1, . . . , Ln denote the amounts of funds spent in each of the risks X1, . . . , Xn. Define
L = L1 + · · ·+ Ln as the total funds spent in the market, in such a way that:
KM = L ·
(
Φ−1(1− r) ·
n∑
i=1
Li
L
σi −
n∑
i=1
Li
L
µi
)
Hence the contributions of the individual exposures to the aggregate demand for cash bal-
ances are given by the coefficients ω1, . . . , ωn, defined as:
ωi =
Li
L1 + · · ·+ Ln ⇔ Li = ωi · L ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
Consequently, the liquidity-preference of the market kM = KM/L must be defined as:
kM(r) = kµ,σ(r) = σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (11)
with:
µ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · µi and σ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · σi
Note that assuming that the optimal surpluses are determined by Equation 10 does not
necessarily imply that investors solve an optimisation problem before deciding their cash
balances. However, as long as for every fund an optimal balance exists, there are incentives
to accordingly adjust the capital structure, for big departures from this level can produce
important losses and eventually lead to bankruptcy. Simple calibration and backtesting can
be used to attain this objective. Thus, whatever the mechanism implemented to determine
their levels of capital — going from a rule of thumb to complicated mathematical modeling
— firms will be assumed to approach as much as possible to the optimal levels corresponded
to their portfolios. On these grounds, a weak version of the hypothesis of rational behaviour is
proposed, according to which the successive aggregate states will be characterised by adding
the risk-based contributions of investors who combine equity and financial assets trying to
build optimal portfolios.
The reader must be wondering at this point why should we consider the characterisa-
tion of the preference for liquidity in the terms presented so far, when the well-established
utility-based framework is widely accepted in economic analysis — according to which the
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demand for liquidity is represented by the surplus demanded by a rational decision-maker
who maximises her or his expected utility. This is indeed the approach suggested by Tobin
(1958) when characterising liquidity-preference as behaviour towards risk and also proposed
in more recent contributions on the subject, such as Choi and Oh (2003) and Holmstrom
and Tirole (2000). However, the following problems arise when implementing this model.
Thus, in the first place, the expressions derived for the money demand from the first-order
condition are not easy to work with and they cannot then be clearly interpreted in terms
of measurable economic variables. Secondly, recall that a parametrical expression has to be
determined for the utility function, as well as for the parameter representing the aversion-to-
risk of the decision-maker. But this coefficient is not observable, a fact that leads the model
to depend on exogenous variables that have to be determined on a subjective basis. As a
consequence, every event of significance (involving adjustments beyond expected) has to be
explained on the basis of exogenous events, like the sudden release of relevant information
or the sudden change in the mood of investors — from risk-aversion to risk-loving or in the
opposite direction. Therefore, and as a final point of criticism, the expected-utility frame-
work cannot satisfactorily account for the whole of the recorded historical events — such
that, in particular, it provides no satisfactory explanation for the liquidity crises occurred in
the past.
By contrast, a great part of the criticism made for the utility approach can be avoided by
adopting the characterisation of the preference for liquidity proposed in this paper. Indeed,
a simple mathematical expression is provided in Equations 10 and 11 to describe the money
demand — i.e. the quantile function of the probability distribution describing the underlying
risk. Moreover, as established in the first-order condition, the optimal amount of capital is
corresponded to an optimal exchange between a flow of probability and the return offered by
a certain flow of cash. Such representation reinterprets the Tobin’s (1958) characterisation
of liquidity-preference as behaviour towards risk. Additionally, the market money demand
explicitly depends on the mean return and the volatility of the series of capital returns of the
market portfolio in the new model, which are certainly observable variables. The question
remains, however, of whether the model can satisfactorily explains the evolution of the
preference for liquidity in normal times as well as in times of turbulence. Before providing
an answer to this question, I will ask the reader to wait until Section 6. First, in the next
section, the cost of capital will be determined on the basis of the monetary equilibrium,
when the money supply is controlled by creditors in deregulated markets.
4 The Cost of Capital as Determined by the Equilib-
rium in the Market of Cash Balances
According to the model developed in Sections 2 and 3, the determinants of the money de-
mand in a close financial market are of two kinds. Firstly, since the optimal levels of reserves
explicitly depends on risk and risks are represented by probability functions belonging to the
class of Gaussian probability distributions, the optimal surplus are ultimately determined
by the mean return and the volatility of the series of capital returns of the market portfolio.
Besides, by imposing the market balance to be equal to the sum of the balances demanded by
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investors, the mean return and the volatility of the market portfolio are expressed as the sum
of the corresponding parameters representing the series of capital returns at the microscopic
level (as stated in Equations 10 and 11). The other variable affecting the money demand is
the cost of capital, defined as the return that allows investors to borrow or lend balances in
the market. Equivalently, the cost of capital can be interpreted as the interest rate offered
by a class of instruments which are regarded as perfect substitutes to money.2
Let us now introduce an alternative framework, where creditors are supposed to control
the total supply of cash balances and the cost of capital is determined in order to satisfy
the necessary equilibrium condition that the flows of funds provided to the market are equal
to the total demanded balances. Accordingly, letting M denote the total amount of capital
supplied by creditors and letting L (as in Section 2) denote the total amount of funds
invested on securities, the following equation must hold:
M = Kµ,σ(r) = L · kµ,σ(r)
Replacing the liquidity-preference function kµ,σ(r) according to Equation 11, we obtain that:
m :=
M
L
= σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (12)
where the ratio m = M/L represents a cash-to-risk ratio, which can be also interpreted
as a supply-to-demand for transactions ratio or a relative money supply. The monetary
equilibrium can then be equivalently established in the following terms:
R :=
m+ µ
σ
= Φ−1(1− r) ⇔ r = 1− Φ
(
m+ µ
σ
)
(13)
In this context, both M and L are control variables of the market or, in other words, both
lenders and borrowers can affect the monetary equilibrium. The expected return and the
volatility of the market portfolio, on the other hand, can be regarded as variables of state,
for they reflect the impact over the market of maintaining the current levels of supplied and
demanded balances. Finally, the interest rate of equilibrium can be also considered as a
state variable that measures the opportunity cost of capital, for it is related to the optimal
exchange of money and risk in the market.
Within this setting, the ratio R represents the rate at which firms agree to exchange the
sure flow (m + µ) for a unit of volatility and can accordingly be regarded as the market
price of risk. It can then be regarded as an alternative measure of risk to the Sharpe ratio,
which, as it is well-known, is equal to the slope of a straight line relating the expected return
to the volatility of every financial security transacted in the market, in such a way that
µ = r+S · σ (see Sharpe, 1966a and 1966b). Unlike the Sharpe ratio, however, the measure
R is respectively induced to rise and to diminish in response to inflationary and deflationary
trends, respectively characterised by increasing and decreasing m. Such a difference is a
consequence of the fact that, while in the model of equilibrium of William Sharpe firms can
borrow or lend any amount of capital at the interest rate r, in the alternative equilibrium
condition established in Equation 13 the liquidity conditions are determined by the relative
2The adopted theoretical framework can then be related to the model of debt managing with free cash
flows suggested by Jensen (1986).
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supply m. Accordingly, within any class of risks with the same market-price, different stocks
of cash are necessarily corresponded to different risk-parameters.
The rate r = TX(m) = 1− Φ(R) thereby represents the return obtained when investing
one monetary unit on the underlying risk and can be accordingly regarded as the Internal
Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR). Thus, while the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a zero-
coupon bond represents the opportunity cost of receiving a cash-flow at some future date
instead of today (see, for example, Hull, 2000), the IRRR can be interpreted as the return to
be paid for holding a given uncertain claim instead of investing on a non-risky zero-coupon
bond with a predetermined maturity.
Figure 1: Interest Rate Elasticity of the Optimal Demand for Cash Balances.
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From the mathematical viewpoint, the IRRR corresponds to the probability that the
current stock of money will suffice to cover the expected imbalance of the market portfolio.
In fact, the lower the IRRR, the lower the tail-probability that the excess of loss of the
market portfolio was greater than the real money-supply. Such a situation is consistent with
(overnight) markets where investors face less difficulties to adjust their end-of-day balances
or equivalently, more liquid markets. By contrast, the tail-probability of the market portfolio
increases with the IRRR and so markets are more illiquid the greater the IRRR. Moreover,
the higher the money spent in transactions with respect to the stock of capital in a given
market, the higher its corresponding IRRR, since in this case the expansion of output is, to a
greater extent, nominal in nature or, equivalently, more inflationary. Conversely, less inflated
funds, characterised by greater cash-to-risk ratios, are assigned lower internal returns.
Finally, a word can be said about the instability of the market. In fact, as long as the
market parameters are determined by Equation 12, changes in any of the control variables
M and L must be followed by adjustments in µ, σ and the IRRR in order to reestablish
the monetary equilibrium. In the particular case when the mean return and the volatility
of the market portfolio remain unchanged, variations in the preference for liquidity can be
explicitly established in terms of the variations in the interest rate:
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∆kµ,σ(r)
kµ,σ(r)
= ǫ(r) · ∆r
r
with ǫ(r) =
r
kµ,σ(r)
· dkµ,σ(r)
dr
where the coefficient ǫ(r) represents the elasticity of the demand for cash balances with
respect to the interest rate — equal to the percentage variation in the demanded cash
balances in response to a percentage movement in the interest rate. From Equation 11, we
obtain that the dependence on risk of the interest rate elasticity is in fact expressed as a
dependence on the mean-to-volatility ratio µ/σ:
ǫ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
= −r
√
2π exp
(
[Φ−1(1− r)]2
2
)
·
[
Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
]−1
(14)
The sign of the elasticity thereby depends on the state parameters, in such a way that:
ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
< 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
> 0 ⇔ r < 1− Φ (µ
σ
) ⇔ kµ,σ(r) > 0
ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
> 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
< 0 ⇔ r > 1− Φ (µ
σ
) ⇔ kµ,σ(r) < 0
When r = 1− Φ (µ
σ
)
, the magnitude of the elasticity is infinite, meaning that at this point
the whole adjustment is produced in quantities.
In this context, the level r = 1−Φ (µ
σ
)
represents a turning-point in capital markets that
separates two different environments: the first one satisfying kµ,σ(r) > 0 and ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
< 0,
and the second one, characterised by kµ,σ(r) < 0 and ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
> 0. As depicted in Figure 1,
the interest rate elasticity is negative and non-increasing in r when r < 1 − Φ (µ
σ
)
, but
it is positive and U-shaped when r > 1 − Φ (µ
σ
)
. An asymptote is produced at the level
r = 1 − Φ (µ
σ
)
, which is located to the left of the axis r = 0.5 when µ > 0 and to the right
of the axis r = 0.5 when µ < 0. Hence, the market is the most unstable when the internal
return on risk approaches to the level r = 1− Φ (µ
σ
)
. Moreover, the greater the magnitude
of the mean-to-volatility ratio, the more the asymptote respectively approaches to the axis
r = 0 and r = 1 when µ > 0 and when µ < 0.
A complete characterisation of the dynamic of the market would require to describe the
variation of the preference for liquidity in terms of the variations in all of the state variables.
Besides, since every cash-to-risk ratiom is corresponded to a set of parameters (µ, σ, IRRR),
multiple equilibria are allowed and then additional conditions are required — determining
an optimal path or a most probable state — in order to predict the future state of the market.
The developing of such a model is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as long as
the set of different combinations of the parameters which are compatible with the monetary
equilibrium for a given relative stock m are determined by Equation 12, it is still possible to
describe the possible states of the market on the basis of a static approach. As will be proved
soon in Section 5, a risk-structure of interest rates can be defined in this way, providing the
optimal return of exchange between risk and money in a market characterised by a given
pair of expected return and volatility.
12
5 The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates
Let us consider in the following some capital market that follows a certain regime with
m = constant. A risk-structure of interest rates on the plane of mean returns and volatili-
ties is then determined by Equation 12, where each rate represents the return to be asked
for receiving a sure cash-flow instead of some uncertain payment. Accordingly, as depicted
in Figure 2, at any fixed level of volatility, the expected return and the internal rate of
return on risk are inversely related. On the other hand, recall that the market price of risk
is incremented when the IRRR decreases and vice-versa (as established in Equation 13).
Consequently, within a class of securities showing the same variability, risks offering differ-
ent expected returns can be assigned the same IRRR (or the same market price) only if
more equity is supplied to the portfolio containing the fund with the lower expected return.
This result ultimately provides a theoretical explanation of why investors show liquidity-
preference.
Figure 2: The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates as a Function of the Expected Return.
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In Figure 3, the evolution of the internal return is shown as a function of the volatility,
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given different fixed levels of the expected return. Thus, as depicted in the upper graph
of Figure 3, within a class of securities offering the same positive expected return, the
IRRR always rises with variability, at the time that for every level of volatility, the IRRR
diminishes when the supply-to-demand ratio is increased. Consequently, the market price of
risk can be inflated both by pumping liquidity and by reducing the variability of the market
portfolio — relations that are compatible with economic intuition.
In the lower graph of Figure 3, the risk-structure is shown for a class of funds offering
negative expected returns. Note that the relationship between internal returns and volatilities
is inverted when the surplus is lower than the expected loss, in such a way that in this range
higher internal returns (or lower market prices) are obtained for lower volatilities. Notice
additionally, from Equation 13, that:
IRRR > 0.5 ⇔ m+µ
σ
< Φ−1(0.5) = 0 ⇔ µ < −m
IRRR < 0.5 ⇔ m+µ
σ
> Φ−1(0.5) = 0 ⇔ µ > −m
Hence the case IRRR > 0.5 is corresponded to the situation when the average capital loss
endured by the market portfolio is higher in magnitude to the relative stock m, while the
case IRRR > 0.5 is related to the situation when the magnitude of the average capital loss
is lower than the relative stock m. Accordingly, the cases IRRR > 0.5 and IRRR < 0.5
respectively characterises insolvent and solvent market portfolios. The asymptote separating
both trends at the axis r = 0.5 corresponds to the case when the demanded and supplied
levels of reserves are equal in magnitude. Besides, σ → +∞ when IRRR→ 0.5, no matter
whether this level is approached from the left or the right of the axis r = 0.5. Indeed,
maximum uncertainty can be expected around the level IRRR = 0.5, for at this point the
market portfolio is not solvent, as in the case IRRR > 0.5, nor insolvent, as in the case
IRRR < 0.5, so that its credit quality is not determined.
Some general rules concerning the evolution of the market can thus be given by using a
partial equilibrium approach. Indeed, notice on the one hand, as shown in Figure 2, that
the equilibrium expected return tends to the cash-to-risk ratio (so that the market price of
risk tends to zero) when the IRRR tends to 0.5 (see Equation 13). On the other hand,
as depicted in Figure 3, the internal return on risk tends to the value r = 0.5 when the
volatility tends to infinite. Besides, the more the IRRR approaches to 0.5, the greater
the volatility adjustment that is required to account for a same absolute variation in the
IRRR. Consequently, the model predicts the appearance of volatility jumps in response to
movements in the IRRR if this variable is close enough to the level r = 0.5. Moreover,
since the concavity of the curve relating the IRRR to σ increases as the risk-to-cash ratio
is diminished and the curve eventually degenerates when m = 0, more drastic volatility
movements are expected for lower ratios.
In conclusion, the mean return and the volatility of the market portfolio, as well as
the internal return on risk, can be regarded as physical properties of markets, which at
equilibrium are connected to each other according to Equation 12 for any given level of
the relative stock of money m = M/L. Consequently, the equilibrium depends on the
interactions between borrowers and lenders on the one hand, who respectively control the
demand and the supply of capital, and the response of the market on the other, which can
be regarded as the involuntary output of the decisions simultaneously and independently
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Figure 3: The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates as a Function of Volatility.
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made by investors, intermediaries and monetary authorities, and which is corresponded to
the probability distributions describing the processes of percentage returns. The fact that
µ and σ are observable variables that can be measured on the base of the historical data,
implies that the model can be empirically tested. This task will be performed in the coming
sections.
6 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical approach presented in the previous sections can be applied to characterise
the cost of capital in different economic contexts. Thus, for example, at the corporate level,
it can be used for the design of a capital allocation mechanism in financial conglomerates (as
proposed by Dhaene et al., 2003, Goovaerts et al., 2005, and Mierzejewski, 2006). In this case,
the Gaussian random variables Xi represent the capital P&L of the portfolios maintained
by the business units and the IRRR represents the internal cost of capital, i.e. the return
to be imposed on the transactions of cash balances inside the institution. Alternatively,
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at the macroeconomic level, the model can be applied to deduce a (theoretically justified)
expression for the money demand of the economy. In this situation, the aggregate exposure
X should be related to the series of capital P&L of the level of nominal income.
Figure 4: Twenty Years of Evolution of the DowJones and the Nasdaq Composite Indexes
and their Corresponding Daily Transacted Funds.
Finally, the model can be also used to describe the monetary equilibrium in a close
financial market, where a total stock of cash M is supplied by creditors and stockholders.
Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, spend the (nominal) quantities Li on securities
and demand equity up to the optimal levels ki(r) defined in Equation 10, in such a way that
the total demand for capital in the market is equal to L · kµ,σ, where kµ,σ denote the market
liquidity-preference (defined in Equation 11), µ and σ denote the risk-parameters of the
market portfolio and L represents the total volume spent on the transactions of securities.
Assuming, in addition, that all the relevant information for investment decisions is con-
tained in the values assigned in the stock exchange, the series of capital returns of the level
of prices in this market should determine the riskiness of the market portfolio. This will
be the framework adopted in the following for the empirical verification of the model. The
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variables under analysis will be the DowJones and the Nasdaq composite indexes, which
respectively represent the industrial and the Information & Technology (IT) sectors of the
economy of United States. The daily valuations of these indexes are depicted in Figure 4,
together with the amounts of funds daily spent on transactions in the corresponding sectors.
The data have been obtained from http : //www.yahoo.com/finance.
Two episodes of crisis can be clearly noticed in Figure 4, occurring in October 1987
and April 2000, and respectively known as the Black Monday and the dot-com bubble in the
literature. In fact, on Monday October 19th, 1987, the DowJones lost more than 25% of
its value to recover only about 5% the day after, thus accumulating in one week, in the two
consecutive days, losses over 40% and 35% respectively. The Nasdaq, in the meantime, lost
more than 10% of its value the same day and nearly 10% the day after, thus accounting for
weekly losses around 20% and 30% on October 19th and 20th respectively. These are among
the most severe declines observed during the whole past century. A striking feature of the
episode is the short time that took the bubble to explode and its lack of fundamentals, for
no major news or events appeared during the prior days to the crash.
Unlike the stock crash of October 1987, the episode of April 2000 mainly affected the
IT companies. In fact, while the DowJones attains a maximum at 11, 722.98 points on
January 14th, 2000, and then falls until reaching 9, 811.24 points on March 14th, 2000, the
Nasdaq attains a maximum at 5, 048.62 points on March 10th, 2000, and then falls until
reaching 3, 400.91 points on May 31st, 2000, in this way respectively accounting for losses of
35% and 15% approximately. It can be also noted in Figure 4 that the funds demanded for
transactions followed a growing path during the nineteen nineties, a fact that is consistent
with the liberalisation of capital markets and the expansionary monetary policy followed by
the Federal Reserve Bank in that period (see Figure 6). Moreover, although the total inflows
of capital are shared in roughly equal parts most of the time, such a tendency is abandoned
in the period starting shortly after April 1999 and extending until shortly before April 2003.
It is well-known, indeed, that towards the mid-nineties, a sentiment of growing confidence
about the future of the dot-com firms predominated. As a consequence, the credit conditions
were facilitated to this industry, both through the reduction of premiums and controls, as
through the publishing of new stock.
Let us then investigate whether the trends followed by the mean returns and the volatil-
ities of the series of capital returns of the DowJones and the Nasdaq, respectively depicted
in the upper and the lower rows of Figure 5, are consistent with the monetary equilibrium
as described in Equations 12 and 13. The mean returns have been estimated as the average
of the daily percentage variations of the indexes observed in the past ninety working days,
while the volatilities have been calculated as the mean standard error:
µt =
1
90
·
t∑
i=t−89
Xi and σt =
√√√√ 1
90
·
t∑
i=t−89
(Xi − µt)2
Thus, in the first place, every peak in the volumes of funds spent on assets shown in the
second row of Figure 4 should be corresponded to a pair of mean and volatility adjustments
in Figure 5. By comparing both figures, we can verify that this is indeed the case. In
particular, the peaks of trading activity occurred in October 1987 and April 2000 are ac-
companied by the major changes in the risk parameters. As a matter of fact, the volatilities
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Figure 5: Expected Returns and Volatilities of the Series of Capital P&L of the DowJones
and the Nasdaq Composite Indexes.
of the series of percentage returns of the DowJones and the Nasdaq respectively multiplied
by more than three and more than four times in October 1987, while their mean returns
suddenly felt from levels around +0.1% to levels around −0.3%. Regarding the episode of
April 2000, there is no evidence of turbulence in the DowJones, for only small variations
in the risk-parameters are observed — as it is expected indeed, since this index did not
burst on that date. The volatility of the Nasdaq, in the meantime, was amplified 1.5 times
approximately, although the major adjustment affected its expected return, which between
February 2000 and May 2000 felt from a historical maximum over 0.6% to a level around
−0.1%.
Other facts predicted by the model can be empirically verified. In fact, from Equation 13,
we obtain that if the IRRR is rising (i.e. if the market price of risk is diminishing) while
the relative supply m = M/L is constant, either the expected return must be reduced or the
volatility must augment. By contrast, if the IRRR is diminishing (i.e. if the market price
of risk is rising) while the relative supply m = M/L is constant, either the expected return
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Figure 6: Federal Funds Rate.
must augment or the volatility must be reduced.
On these grounds, we can say that under any of the combined regimes (µ ↓ , σ ↑) and
(µ ↑ , σ ↓), the risk-parameters push the market in the same direction: i.e. the IRRR is
incremented and the market price of risk is reduced in the former case, while the IRRR
is reduced and the market price of risk is incremented in the later. In any different sit-
uation, i.e. either when (µ ↓ , σ ↓) and when (µ ↑ , σ ↑), the effects of the mean return
and the volatility compensate each other. We then conclude that the most severe liquidity
adjustments should be characterised by sudden movements of opposite sign affecting the
risk-parameters. Several episodes occurred between October 1984 and April 2004 follow this
pattern, like those observed in October 1990, April 1998 and April 2002, as well as in the
stock crashes of October 1987 and April 2000 (see Figures 4 and 5).
To complete the description of the monetary equilibrium, still the paths followed by the
liquidity-preference function and the internal rate of return on risk have to be analysed. This
will be done in the next sections by separately considering two different settings. Thus, first
the level of the rate of interest will be regarded as given in Section 7 (as in a competitive
framework), so that the adjustments in markets will be exclusively produced in quantities,
i.e. they will exclusively affect the variables M and L. Next in Section 8, the cash-to-risk
ratio m = M/L will be fixed, in such a way that the equilibrium will be reestablished by
exclusively affecting the IRRR.
7 Maintaining the Monetary Equilibrium with Adjust-
ments in Quantities
Let us suppose in the following that firms are allowed to exchange overnight balances without
restrictions at the free-of-risk interest rate r0, which will be represented by the Federal Funds
Rate (FFR) and whose evolution is depicted in Figure 6. This is equivalent to assume that
lenders are price-takers and that no transaction costs nor credit premiums are charged to
19
the price of debt. The optimal demand for money is then given by the inverse of the quantile
function of the series of capital P&L of the market portfolio, as in Equation 11, and the
level of reserves Kµ,σ demanded by the market is given by:
Kµ,σ(r0) = L · kµ,σ(r0) = L ·
[
σ · Φ−1(1− r0)− µ
]
(15)
Let us then analise the empirical evidence provided by the series of capital P&L of the
DowJones and the Nasdaq during the nineteen eighties and the nineteen nineties. We
would like to know whether the preference for liquidity remains more or less stable — as
assumed in standard macroeconomic analysis — and whether the episodes of liquidity crises
already described can be corresponded to adjustments in the liquidity-preference and the
demanded reserves functions.
Figure 7: Preference for Liquidity and Demanded Reserves.
As depicted in the first column of Figure 7, although the preference for liquidity and
the demand for cash balances are indeed fluctuating variables, they show a stable growing
tendency during nearly the whole period going from October 1984 to October 1993, the
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only exception being the sharp increments shown in October 1987. In fact, in the case
of the DowJones, the level of demanded reserves was multiplied by eight around October
1987 (going from about USD 2 MM to about USD 16 MM), a result that is compatible
with the fact that the liquidity demand was multiplied by five around October 87 (rising
from 1% to 5%), while the level of demanded cash-balances L was multiplied by 1.5 (rising
from less than USD 200 MM to about USD 300 MM). Regarding the Nasdaq, the level of
demanded reserves and the preference for liquidity were respectively amplified about 8 and
6 times, while the demand for cash balances was multiplied by 1.3 approximately. Notice
also that the effects of the crisis were endured in both industries, although the magnitude
of the required adjustment was greater for the DowJones composite index. Finally, the
short-lasting nature of the event is capture by the liquidity-preference function as well, for
the levels that predominated before the crisis had already been attained towards October
1988.
Let us now analise the episode of April 2000. As shown in the second column of Figure 7,
although the liquidity-preference of both indexes rose steadily from roughly the first quarter
of 1997 until the last quarter of 2002, most of the time the magnitude of this coefficient is
greater for the Nasdaq, specially after April 2000. The crisis signaled at this point must then
be regarded as one particular adjustment occurred at the middle of a more extended period
of turbulence primarily affecting the IT industry. Inspecting the graph located to the lower
right corner of Figure 7, we can additionally notice that the increment in the preference for
liquidity is partly compensated by a reduction in the funds demanded for transactions L (see
also Figure 4), in such a way that only from the beginnings of the year 2000 until the ends
of 2003 the balances demanded for precautionary motives surpassed the levels considered
as normal up to that moment. However, since the lift of the liquidity-preference of the
Nasdaq is sharpest on April 2000, the burst of the bubble can be established at this point,
in accordance to the analysis of the previous section.
In conclusion, the two episodes of crisis so far analised can be fully described by means of
the money demand functions defined in Equations 11 and 15, in the sense that not only the
moments when the bubbles bursted are precisely determined, also the main characteristics
of the crises are satisfactorily explained.
8 Maintaining the Monetary Equilibrium with Adjust-
ments in the Cost of Capital
Let us now assume that firms are obliged to fit their reserves in order to peg their cash-to-risk
ratios to a fixed proportion α, i.e. m = K/L = α. Such could be a restriction established by
a regulatory authority, but it could be also imposed as a tacit requirement in markets with
informational asymmetries. As a matter of fact, when intermediaries cannot fully observe
the portfolios held by their customers, the leverage ratios provide a signal of the capacity
to pay liabilities back and thus explicitly affect the price of debt. The level of the internal
return on risk that is compatible with the monetary equilibrium under such circumstances
is obtained by replacing m = α in Equation 13:
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Figure 8: Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR) and Interest Rate Elasticity of the Liq-
uidity Demand with Constant Relative Supply.
rα = 1− Φ
(
µ+ α
σ
)
(16)
Hence rα → 0.5 when σ →∞ (see Figure 3). In fact, as already stated in Section 5, under
regimes that maintain a constant relative stock of money, decreasing expected return and
increasing volatility are both markets trends that push the induced internal return rα to the
axis r = 0.5 (or push the market price of risk to zero) and consequently push the market to
more unstable states.
From Equations 14 and 16, the following expression is obtained for the elasticity:
ǫα = −rασ
√
2π
α
· exp
[
(µ+ α)2
2σ2
]
(17)
Therefore, the sign of the interest rate elasticity is always negative, which means that incre-
ments of the cost of capital are always followed by reductions in the amount of demanded
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cash balances and vice versa. Besides, the magnitude of the elasticity converges to infinite
when σ → ∞, i.e. |ǫα| → ∞ when σ → ∞. This result reinforces the claim stated in the
previous paragraph, that the market becomes more unstable as σ →∞ and rα → 0.5.
The internal returns on risk and the elasticities of the demand for cash balances, computed
according to Equations 16 and 17, are respectively depicted in the first and the second rows
of Figure 8, when the cash-to-risk ratio is pegged to the level α = 1%. Notice that jumps in
rα and ǫr (rα) are produced around the episodes of crisis — in the same way that this events
were distinguished by jumps in the preference for liquidity when the cost of capital was peg to
the Federal Funds Rate in the previous section. In fact, around October 1987, rα drastically
rose to a historical maximum, while ǫr (rα) suddenly felt to a historical minimum. Besides,
the signal appeared in both indexes and its influence was short-lasting, in accordance to the
empirical facts characterising this crisis. Regarding the episode of April 2000, the times of
turbulence are located on a broader interval, with a clear predominance of the signals related
to the Nasdaq, in consistence with the fact that only this index crashed on that date, and
the most unexpected movements are produced precisely in April 2000.
We can then conclude that many of the facts observed in stock markets can be satisfac-
torily explained within the theoretical framework proposed in this paper. Besides, both the
configurations of the risk-parameters µ and σ, as well as the values of the liquidity-preference
function and the IRRR, can be corresponded to specific states of the market, in such a way
that, in particular, episodes of crisis can be precisely described. However, although in this
context kµ,σ and the IRRR can be regarded as signals of liquidity adjustments, such signals
only appear after the corresponding events have been produced and hence they cannot be
used to make predictions. This is a consequence of the fact that only a partial equilibrium
approach has been followed in this paper and hence the equilibrium ultimately depends on
variables whose evolution is unknown (as it is the case with L, µ and σ) and have to be
treated in practice as exogenous variables. Although this is certainly an important limita-
tion, the model still provides a precise definition of liquidity and of instability, capable of
accounting for the behaviour of capital markets both under normal circumstances and in
times of turbulence — as illustrated with the empirical analysis so far developed.
9 Conclusions
As long as in perfect capital markets funds can be lend and borrow without restrictions at
a single and exogenously determined interest rate, financial institutions can always adjust
their surpluses and accordingly, their market values do not depend on the implemented
capital structures (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, this mechanism does not work
efficiently in markets of contractual liabilities established by opaque intermediaries with
default sensitive customers (Merton, 1974, 1977 and 1997). Within this framework, the role
of financial institutions is that of providing the services of hedging and diversification to
customers that cannot trade by themselves. Optimal option-based arrangements, contingent
on the outstanding surplus (equal to difference between the outstanding assets and liabilities)
at the maturity date, can then be issued to assure that the value of the firm is maximised
and the cost of insolvency is minimised.
An alternative approach is proposed in this paper for the characterisation of markets
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where intermediaries can only hedge and diversify up to a limited extent and are accord-
ingly obliged to rely on deposit insurance and capital cushions. The optimal contracts are
established in actuarial terms, in such a way that the expected insured capital gain of the in-
termediary’s portfolio is maximised and the cost of bankruptcy is minimised (see Equations 6
and 8), while the optimal liquidity demands are expressed as the quantile function of the
probability distributions describing risks (as in Equations 7, 9 and 10).
The level of reserves demanded by the market is thereby characterised by the sum of
the surpluses demanded by investors, intermediaries and customers. As a result, the market
expected returns and volatilities are expressed as the weighted averages of the mean returns
and volatilities of the individual portfolios (see Equation 11). The role of investors when
deciding their balances in deregulated markets can then be related to that of subsidiaries in
decentralised organisations, where an internal cost of capital is given and the total surplus
is equal to the sum of the divisional contributions (see Merton and Perold, 1993, and also
Mierzejewski, 2006).
More generally, when the supply of reserves is controlled by creditors, the cost of capital
is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the equilibrium in the market of cash balances
(as in Equations 12 and 13). In this context, the market interest rate represents the return
obtained when investing one monetary unit on risk and can be accordingly regarded as the
Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR). Given any fixed pair of liquidity supply and
balances demanded for transactions, a risk-structure of interest rates is determined in the
plane of expected returns and volatilities (see Figures 2 and 3).
In conclusion, variations in the rate of growth of the funds spent on transactions or in
the stock of money must be necessarily followed by market adjustments reflected in the
relative prices of securities. Up to some extent, such movements will be compensated by the
internal return on risk, but also the mean return and the volatility of the market portfolio
are expected to be affected, for these parameters completely characterise risks in a Gaussian
setting. Different scenarios are thus corresponded to different combinations of the involved
parameters, some of which can be related to more stable and others to more vulnerable
states. In this way, both normal times, when credit is plentiful, as well as times of financial
turmoil, are possible in the model, depending on the flows of capital and the paths followed
by the risk parameters. The equilibrium mechanism of capital markets is thus essentially
physical in nature — and not only affected by psychological and informational shocks. The
predictions of the model can be verified by analysing the historical data.
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